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Abstract
Since the early 1990s, transitional justice has established itself as a
field of study and practice. Proponents make normative links
between transitional justice processes—for example, criminal trials,
truth commissions and reparations—and broader societal and
systemic outcomes, such as healing, reconciliation, peace and
This article is based on an earlier, more detailed report with extensive annexes,
which can be found on the Justice and Security Research Programme website:
Anna Macdonald, “Local Experiences of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: What
does the evidence tell us?” Justice and Security Research Programme Working Paper 6
(2013).
The author would like to acknowledge the dedicated team of research assistants at
the LSE’s Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) who helped develop
this evidence paper project in its early stages: Noemi De Luca, Jillian Feirson,
Margeaux Fischer, Yuna Han, Rachel Hoff, Vishista Sam, Danielle Stein, Judy
Taing, Craig Valters, Petar Atanasov. Thanks also go to Tim Allen, Holly Porter
and Henry Radice for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks go
to Anouk Rigterink who provided invaluable advice and direction on the
methodology of the paper and to Sarah Jane Cooper-Knock whose careful
suggestions have strengthened the paper significantly. This paper also benefitted
considerably from the comments and insights of Pablo De Grieff as well as Wendy
Lambourne and an anonymous reviewer. Research for this paper was funded by the
JSRP with funding from the UK Department for International Development
(DFID).
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democracy. There is, however, a paucity of evidence on the actual
effects and experiences of transitional justice interventions in waraffected and fragile places. This paper uses a bibliographic search
methodology to pull together the extant evidence on local
experiences of transitional justice interventions and finds that local
perceptions and experiences of these processes are complex and do
not conform with widely-held normative assertions about what
transitional justice “ought” to accomplish. The implications for the
transitional justice field are examined and recommendations for
future research are proposed.
Introduction
In the aftermath of World War Two, Karl Jaspers, the German
psychiatrist and philosopher, offered a series reflections on what it
means to confront, cope with, and even recover from, a collective
history of violence, suffering and mass crime. Against the backdrop
of the Nuremberg trials, he boldly challenged his fellow citizens: “our
only chance for salvation lies in total frankness and honesty… this
path alone may save our soul from the life of a pariah. Whatever
comes to us we must see it come. This is a daring spiritual and
political act on the edge of the abyss.” 2 When these words were first
spoken to a university audience in 1946, they encouraged a radical
exposure to history, to wrongdoing, and to guilt. Today, the
sentiments Jaspers expressed have, to some extent, been normalized
in international relations and diplomacy. Confronting the past,
allocating accountability and dispensing justice for wrongdoing at
critical junctures in a nations history remains a tense, uncertain and
morally fraught process, but it is a process that has been gradually
institutionalized and professionalized under the broad umbrella of
what today we call “transitional justice.”
Transitional justice is now associated with a set of processes,
including criminal trials, truth commissions, amnesties, communitybased dispute mechanisms and reparations; and a set of institutional
2 Quoted in Pierre Hazan, Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and Reconciliation
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 19.
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structures and regimes, including the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and international humanitarian, human rights and criminal
law.3 It is also an inter-disciplinary field of scholarly inquiry, offering
perspectives from political science, anthropology, law, geography,
sociology and education.4 Since the early 1990s, well over a billion
dollars has been spent on transitional justice mechanisms.5 The
former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined
the UN’s normative commitment to transitional justice in his
landmark report on the topic in 2004, Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.6 Diplomats, international
lawyers, politicians and scholars have echoed the refrain that
transitional justice must be implemented in post conflict places—
and increasingly in situations of active conflict—not only to ensure
accountability for odious crimes but also to promote peace,
reconciliation, truth and societal change.7 In 2011, the World
Development Report made explicit links between transitional justice,
security and development and the UN Human Rights Council
established a mandate for a special rapporteur on the promotion of
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence of serious
crimes and gross violations of human rights.8 Access to justice,
including transitional justice, is now widely regarded as a crucial

Alexander Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities
after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 4.
4 For a thorough conceptual history of transitional justice see Paige Arthur, “How
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31:2 (2009): 321–367; see also Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5 Harvey Weinstein, “Editorial Note: The Myth of Closure, the Illusion of
Reconciliation: Final Thoughts on Five Years as Co-Editor-in-Chief,” International
Journal of Transitional Justice, 5.1 (2011): 1.
6 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field”
or “Non-Field”,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3.1 (2009): 9.
7 Leslie Vinjamuri, “Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International
Justice,” Ethics & International Affairs 24.2 (2010): 191–211.
8 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2011), 166.
3
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component of the post-2015, i.e. post Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) agenda.
Despite the growth of the field and the proliferation of
transitional justice practices, we still have a very rudimentary
understanding of how these interventions actually affect people in the
fragile and war-affected places where atrocities have been perpetrated
and experienced. 9 The first scholars to really engage with the “local”
in transitional justice asked whether “universalistic assumptions about
the benefits of justice accord with what people think on the ground?”
and whether “adequate account is taken of non-western cultures and
beliefs and local practices of justice?”10 Since then, edited collections
and journal issues have been published that engage closely with how
transitional justice is viewed from the bottom up, across cases. 11 But
these are areas of inquiry that remain in their infancy.
A parallel development in the field has been a series of
quantitative, large-N comparative studies, which employ datasets in
order to try and establish causal links between transitional justice and
broader, systemic statebuilding objectives such as peace,
democratization, and human rights adherence.12 These studies build
See for example, Oskar Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “The State Level
Effects of Transitional Justice,” Centre for International Policy Studies Working Paper
(April, 2008); Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey Chapman,
Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington
DC: United States Institute of Peace Research, 2009); Special Edition: Transitional
Justice on Trial: Evaluating its impact, in International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3
(2010): 315-508; Weinstein, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice
5.1 (2011): 1.
10 Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein My Neighbour, My Enemy: justice and community in
the aftermath of mass atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Laurel
Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein “Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional
Justice: A Historical Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly 32.1 (2008): 165.
11 Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan, Localizing Transitional Justice:
Interventions and priorities after mass violence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010);
Hinton, Transitional Justice, 4; Special Edition: Transitional Justice and the Everyday,
in International Journal of Transitional Justice 6.3 (2012): 385-572.
12 See, for example, Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter, Transitional
Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington DC: United States
Institute for Peace, 2010); Hun Joon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the
9
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upon the “justice cascade” theory, conceptualized by Ellen Lutz and
Kathryn Sikkink as a “dramatic shift in the legitimacy of the norms of
individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an
increase in actions (like prosecutions) on behalf of those norms.”13
The argument follows that since the 1970s, there has been a
proliferation of national, transnational and international criminal
accountability for human rights crimes, and that this represents a
“tipping point,” a moment where “a critical mass of actors has
adopted a norm or practice, creating a strong momentum for
change.”14 More recent studies have gone some way towards trying
to measure the effects of individual criminal accountability for human
rights abuses and other transitional justice mechanisms and so far,
they have focused exclusively on macro-level outcomes. They
therefore tell us very little about ground level experiences and we
remain unclear about how, if at all, macro-level outcomes such as a
human rights prosecution, actually relate to micro-level outcomes. A
more problematic issue with the large-N, macro-level impact studies
is that critics have pointed to several methodological and data
problems plaguing them.15
In 2011-12, a research team at the Justice and Security
Research Programme (JSRP), a research consortium based at the
London School of Economics (LSE), designed a systematic
bibliographic search methodology in an attempt to pull together the
extant evidence base on local experiences of transitional justice in
conflict affected and fragile places. It is hoped that such an exercise
will tell us something about how those at the receiving end of
transitional justice interventions understand, experience and interact
with these processes.

Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,”
International Studies Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939-96.
13 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing
World Politics (W.W. Norton: New York, 2011), 6.
14 Ibid., 7.
15 See Thoms, Ron and Paris for a full review of these studies.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121
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The “local” here is understood broadly as studies of the substate—of communities and of individuals—and it is used
interchangeably with “micro-level.” Cognizant of the dangers of
conceptualising the local as a “level” and the implicit connotations
with “remoteness, marginality and circumscribed contours,” the
approach here was to borrow from Shaw et al.’s description of the
local as a “standpoint based in a particular locality but not bound by
it.”16 Thus, the analytical focus is on those people, or groups, who
may be the actual or potential victims of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide, and the actual or potential recipients or
beneficiaries of transitional justice interventions. At the same time, it
is acknowledged that certain individuals and groups may have the
agency (power and resources) to shape the transitional justice agenda,
as well as be subject to it, whether as creators of transitional justice
(e.g. local level justice and reconciliation institutions), or alternatively
as perpetrators of injustice.
At issue is whether internationally promoted and generalized
concepts (for example “truth,” “justice,” and “reconciliation”), and
practices (for example truth commissions, trials, and amnesties),
resonate in the societies in which they are being advocated for and
implemented today. Some of these places are transitioning politically,
some are transitioning from war to peace, and others are barely doing
either. They are places as politically and culturally diverse as
Columbia, Uganda, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Libya. The very
word “justice” has no direct translation in many of these contexts
and even where it does, individual and group perceptions about what
justice actually means can range from access to healthcare to the
ability to pay for a decent burial.17
This study carries with it two inherent tensions. The first is
between the aim to generalize and the many specific, individual
contexts examined. It must be stated then that this examination is
nascent, not conclusive: it does not seek to impose a summary
Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 6.
Tim Allen, Trial justice : The international criminal court and the Lord’s Resistance Army,
(London: Zed Books, 2006); and Emily Winterbotham, Healing the Legacies of Conflict
in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011).

16
17
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judgment on whether transitional justice works or not. A positivist,
results-orientated study would be problematic because it is not
methodologically sound to compare or generalize across studies that
are measuring different things in different ways in order to draw
conclusions about whether transitional justice is, for example,
“harmful” or “beneficial.”
The second tension is that this meta-analysis aims to examine
local experiences through the broad normative lenses of what
proponents argue transitional justice processes ought to achieve, and
yet there remains a lack of what development experts and
practitioners have termed a “theory of change.”18 We still do not
have a clear enough understanding of who and what transitional
justice is for and what it is designed to accomplish in any given
context.19 Therefore, we risk measuring a particular TJ project against
criteria it never intended to meet.20 It is beyond the scope of this
paper to make explicit the theories of change to which each TJ
mechanism may subscribe and then to test whether such a change
has been delivered. The approach taken here, more amorphously
perhaps, is to synthesize some of the broader normative claims made
about TJ processes and to assemble a guide to the existing empirical
data, examining what it tells us about how transitional justice
interventions are understood and experienced locally, and how
contextual specifics may shape, alter or impact upon these
interventions.

Danielle Stein and Craig Valters, “Understanding Theory of Change in
International Development,” Justice and Security Research Programme Working Paper 1
(2012); and Colleen Duggan, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional
Justice 4.3 (2010): 315–328.
19 Duggan, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 13.
20 International Council on Human Rights Policy, No Perfect Measure: Rethinking
evaluation and assessment of human rights work, (2012), 12. The author would also like to
thank Pablo De Grieff for highlighting many of the points elaborated in this
paragraph.
18
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Search methodology and findings
A mixed bibliographic search strategy, comprising three stages, was
designed and conducted between June 2011 and November 2012.
The first stage was a database-driven search. While there are a large
number of existing databases, those selected for the searches are
commonly accepted as the most important search engines for social
sciences and topically the most relevant for the research question.21
Once the search strings had been devised and the search had been
conducted, inclusion criteria were applied.22 Only studies published
after 1983 were selected. This was the date of the first trials of the
military juntas in Argentina, a point from which the transitional
justice debate began gaining momentum.23 Only studies published in
English were selected—this was recognized as a major but
unavoidable limitation, given resource constraints. Studies were also
selected on the basis that they were interrogating the experiences of
people living in war-affected and fragile locations. The total relevant
yield from the database searches was 315 articles, books and papers.
It soon became clear that some key literature, both academic
and non-academic, was missing from the systematic database-driven
search. A second search stage, a “snowball” technique, was therefore
adopted. This involved an examination of relevant footnotes and
bibliographies from the articles, books and papers that the database
searches had yielded. The research team also examined the archives
of the International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ) since its
creation in 2007 and the “grey” literature produced by the
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) since its creation
The following databases were selected: SCOPUS, ISI, IBSS, EBSCO (selecting
Peace Research Abstracts, International Development Abstracts, International
Political Science Abstracts, Race Relations Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Criminal
Justice Abstracts), African Journals Online, CIAO, Hein Online, West Law, Google
Scholar, Refseek, LSE Library Catalog, COPAC, and WorldCAT.
22 For a detailed description of how the search strategy was devised, see
Macdonald, 11-13.
23 See for example David Pion-Berlin, “To Prosecute or Pardon? Human Rights
Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone,” in Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume 1 (Washington
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 82.
21
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in 2001. Preliminary results were crosschecked against the inclusion
criteria. The snowball search produced an additional 67 citations.
Finally, to supplement the database and snowball driven
searches a peer-led literature review was conducted. This involved
identifying and selecting peers and authorities in the field, both
scholars and practitioners. Twenty individuals were contacted with a
request to identify at least five relevant sources, including books,
articles, working papers and reports. Six replied and provided a total
of 27 references (some of which were overlapping).24 The peer-led
search produced a literature that converged significantly with what
had been yielded through the previous two searches. In total, it
produced only 3 studies that had not already been identified.
Once the three search strategies had been completed, a more
rigorous screening for inclusion of “local level” empirical data was
undertaken. This led to the number of relevant citations being cut
from 385 to 273. The 273 sources were then evaluated using an
evidence-grading template, which had been devised using UK
Department for International Development (DFID) evidence grading
guidelines.25 The template was designed to evaluate the literature
based on the level and quality of empirical data employed to generate
theories and arguments (<10%, 10-50%, >50%), according to the
methodology used for data collection (quantitative using existing or
new datasets; qualitative based on either interviews of observation; or
“other”).
Of the 273 journal articles, books, and reports that were
graded, 32% were coded as containing less than 10% empirical data;
36% as containing between 10-50% empirical data; and 32%
contained 50% or more empirical data. Of those books, articles and
reports that contained more than 10% empirical data, 6.6% were
recorded as quantitative using an existing data set; 21% were
Thank you to Mark Freeman, Hugo van der Merwe, Chandra Sriram, Oskar
Thoms, Leslie Vinjamuri and Harvey Weinstein for generously sharing their
recommendations.
25 This was developed at the London School of Economics (LSE) by Anouk
Rigterink using the DFID evidence grading guidelines and with input from JSRP
partners. See “JSRP evidence grading template” in Macdonald, 86.
24
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recorded as quantitative using an original dataset; 26.9% were
recorded as qualitative, observation-based; 56.9% were recorded as
qualitative, interview based and 34.8% were recorded as “other.”
These percentages add up to more than 100% because individual
works were often coded as containing more than one methodology.26
Overall, then, studies based on primary research were most
commonly qualitative, employing interview and focus group
methodologies. The “other” category refers to empirical data derived
from archival literature, government reports and films, for example,
and is well represented because it tended to be used as a method in
conjunction with one of the other four approaches listed above.

In terms of country and regional distribution of individual
case studies, a lot of case study material was gathered on the former
Yugoslavia (13). If single case studies on Bosnia and Herzegovina
(9), Serbia (4), Croatia (1) and Kosovo (3) are included, that number
rises to thirty. This area experienced the first major experiment in
pursuing justice during conflict in the form of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Regionally,
Central Africa was the most highly represented area (62). Southern
Africa (32) and West Africa (31) were also well represented. This is
perhaps not surprising given that all of the International Criminal
As a percentage of all 273 papers, including those with less than 10% empirical
data, 4.4% were classed as quantitative using an existing data set; 10.3% were
classed as quantitative gathering own data; 17.6% were qualitative (observation
based). 37.7% were qualitative, interview based and 23.1% were classed as “other.”
26
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Court’s official investigations and active cases are in Africa (Uganda,
DRC, Libya, Central African Republic, Sudan, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire,
Mali); and this is a region that has seen multiple attempts to pursue
justice after and during mass conflict in contexts where peace
remains fragile and uncertain.

Despite this, there was a huge variation in volume of research
per country, particularly within broader sub-Saharan African regions.
Rwanda (25), Sierra Leone (24), Uganda (25) and South Africa (24)
make up the majority of studies in this area, while Central African
Republic (3), DRC (5) and Kenya (1) were noticeably underresearched when the literature search was conducted in 2011-12, and
Chad, another country where transitional justice processes have been
widely debated, was not represented at all. Although these areas
probably are under researched it is also likely that some literature was
not identified because it was not published in English. This may also
be the case in other places which did not appear to have generated
much relevant literature, in particular Guatemala (6) and Columbia
(3). Finally, it was striking that Middle East and North African
countries (MENA) were so under-represented in the literature.
Despite transitional justice being a key theme during the Arab Spring
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121
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uprisings, this has been a relatively recent development and the
searches did not produce any existing literature relevant to the
criteria.27

A frequent set of responses to the longer version of this study
is along the lines of, “Surely there has been something published on
Lebanon or Nepal?” or “What about the role that identity politics
play?” The review is somewhat restricted by its methodology; the
methodology was designed to be as systematic and transparent as
possible, comprising a formal search of web-based databases
complemented with requests to experts in the field to identify key
literature, and snowball searches of bibliographies and references. A
combination of these methods mitigated the shortcomings of each
but there are still cases where relevant literature may not have been
captured.
Below is a summary and analysis of the existing state of
empirical knowledge on the local experiences and effects of
transitional justice processes in war-affected and fragile spaces.
Although reference is not made to every study that the literature
search yielded, some key works are identified.28 These were selected
It is, of course, quite possible that relevant material has been published
subsequently, although a peer-led search on this area in December 2012 did not
produce any results.
28 For a short summary of each study that was reviewed, there is an annotated
bibliography which can be accessed at
27
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because they had a strong evidence base (as measured during the
grading exercise) and/or because they appear to fit or generate
broader theories. Selecting particular studies for further examination
in this way does inject a degree of author subjectivity into the study
but it also allows for the two criteria above to be met, whilst also
ensuring some geographic spread in the studies under discussion.
The analysis of findings is divided up by transitional justice
process. Each section begins with an overview of the key normative
and theoretical debates relevant to each process, followed by a review
of the evidence based literature. General findings and conclusions
are drawn together at the end of the paper.
Trials
Trials for conflict-related crimes—genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity—can be pursued by various means, including
domestic courts, hybrid tribunals and international tribunals and
courts. Trial advocates argue that widespread benefits will result
from legal prosecution, including accountability, truth, reconciliation,
peace, deterrence and promotion of the rule of law. A major
justification for the creation of the ICTY was the argument that legal
accountability for war crimes would lead to sustainable peace in the
region.29 The preamble to the Rome Statute, which established the
International Criminal Court in 2002, also recognizes a link between
accountability and peace in its statement, “[r]ecognising that such
grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the
world.”30 Thus trials are perceived to have a retributive and utilitarian
function: the logic follows that credible threats of punishment will
change the calculations of potential perpetrators, re-enforcing

http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP
6.AnnBib.pdf
29 Payam Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” Human Rights Quarterly
20.4 (1998): 737–816.
30 Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1 July 2002.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121
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acceptable norms and consolidating political stability.31 It is further
argued that formal prosecution will provide an authoritative
“rendering of the truth,” which subsequently forms a foundation for
the envisioning and realisation of civil stability and national
reconciliation.32 Finally, criminal justice, it is argued, serves the needs
of victims, offering a direct therapeutic and moral response to the
pain they have suffered.33
As has been noted, there is very little empirical data to
support normative and theoretical claims about the benefits of
domestic, hybrid and international war crimes trials.34 The two most
powerful and enduring criticisms of war crimes trials are, firstly, that
such efforts will perpetuate a war or de-stabilize post-war efforts to
build a secure peace.35 Secondly, that the intersection between law,
politics and power means that justice will always be compromised in
favour of political settlements because nations are the actors, the
legislators, the executives, as well as the judges of international law.36
Payam Akhavan, 743-51; Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume 1 (Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 2005), 128; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness:
Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 123;
Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation,” The Yale Law Journal 106.7 (1997): 2030-1.
32 Akhavan; Teitel; Kritz; Jaime Malmud-Goti, “Transitional Governments in the
Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?” Human Rights Quarterly 12.1 (1990): 11-13;
Diane Orentlicher, ‘settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Journal of International Law 100.8 (1991): 2546.
33 Kritz, 128; Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for
Justice (London: Times Books, 1998), 49; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human
Rights in International Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),
19.
34 Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking
the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,” Human Rights Quarterly 24.3 (2002):
584.
35 Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, “Trials and Errors: Principles and Pragmatism
in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28.3 (2003): 5-44.
36 Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (New York:
Cornell University Press, 2009); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization
in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Victor
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What the evidence tells us
There appears to be a leaning in the local level empirical literature
towards examining victim-survivor perceptions of trial processes and
the factors that shape them. These find mixed and interesting results.
In his interview based study of the Municipality of Prijedor in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Refik Hodzic found that
personal experiences of being included or excluded from the process
shaped views on the ICTY and the Court of BiH.37 He noted that
those who testified enjoyed a short-term “therapeutic” effect, while
those who were excluded, based their views on insufficient or
incorrect information from the media or word-of-mouth. 38 Despite
this, both types of victim shared growing scepticism about the ability
of the ICTY and the Court of BiH to provide justice for victims and
deter future crimes.39 Studies such as these are, of course, only
representative of a certain place at a certain time. One way of getting
around this limitation is via longitudinal research, so it is encouraging
that two scholars have undertaken interesting baseline studies in
Kenya and Cambodia at the outset of international legal proceedings
in those places.40
A striking finding across studies is the apparent disconnect
between international legal priorities, and frameworks, and local
understandings of justice. In Timor-Leste, for example, Erica Harper
analysed 116 interviews with a range of individuals, from the general
public to employees of UN Transitional Administration in TimorLeste (UNAET), and found that local perspectives on evidence and

Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for
State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
37 Refik Hodzic, “Living the Legacy of Mass Atrocities: Victims” Perspectives on
War Crimes Trials,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 8.1 (2010): 123-4.
38 Ibid., 123-25.
39 Ibid., 124.
40 David Backer, Joseph Lahouchuc, and James Long, “Addressing the PostElection Violence: Micro-Level Perspectives on Transitional Justice in Kenya,”
Oxford Working Papers (2010); James Gibson, Jeffrey Sonis, and Sokhom Hean,
“Cambodians” Support for the Rule of Law on the Eve of the Khmer Rouge
Trials,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 377–396.
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due process diverged considerably from those of the UN.41 For the
East Timorese population, for example, she found that guilt was
based upon a “shared sense of knowing” rather than an “objectively
applied” legal process.42 In her study of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Tara Urs came to similar
findings.43 Her ethnographic study conducted between May 2005
and April 2007 involved 117 interviews in rural areas of Cambodia.
Urs found that 20 per cent of those she interviewed showed
resistance to engaging with the Court, and noted that people’s
reluctance was consistent with cultural notions of hierarchy and a
feeling that the Court was “above” ordinary people. Furthermore,
she found that legal concepts such as defence rights, reasonable
doubt and evidentiary standards were both unfamiliar and alienating
to the general Cambodian population.44 In a similar vein, Tim
Kelsall, in an anthropological study of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL), noted that the court “failed in crucial ways to adjust to
the local culture in which it worked.”45 Kelsall noted, for example,
that the Court ‘sidestepped” the issue of magic and the occult during
the trial and elected to judge only what it deemed “material.” This
western-centric view, he suggests, does little to ensure that “judicial
decisions make sense to the communities in which they are made.”46
There is very little data in the extant literature to support or
challenge normative arguments that suggest causal links between
trials and deterrence, individual and social healing, or reconciliation at
the micro-level. In 2004, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein
published My Enemy, My Neighbour, an edited collection which
brought together ten inter-disciplinary teams over a period of four
Erica Harper, “Delivering Justice in the Wake of Mass Violence: New
Approaches to Transitional Justice,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10.2 (2005):
149–185.
42 Ibid., 165.
43 Tara Urs, “Imagining locally-motivated accountability for mass atrocities: voices
from Cambodia,” International Journal on Human Rights 7:4 (2007): 61-99.
44 Ibid., 70, 77.
45 Tim Kelsall, Culture under cross-examination: international justice and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.
46 Ibid., 170.
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years to examine the micro-level impacts of the ICTY and the
ICTR.47 The editors found no clear links between criminal trials and
reconciliation.48 They argued that international tribunals worked best
in conjunction with a variety of other measures including local
initiatives that proved more attentive to social integration and
reconstruction and to the needs and wishes of those most directly
affected by violence.
Since then, studies which have attempted to understand the
relationship between trials and peacebuilding and reconciliation—
largely in the context of the ICTY—have come to different
conclusions. James Meernik, for example, carried out statistical
analysis of existing monthly time series “event” data, drawn from
local press reports in Bosnia, from January 1996 to July 2003. 49
Controlling for other factors, he used this to test the effects that
prominent arrests and verdicts had on levels of inter-ethnic conflict
and cooperation in Bosnia.50 Meernik found that the ICTY had a
very limited effect on improving relations among Bosnia’s ethnic
groups and no statistically significant effect on societal peace. On the
other hand the actions of the EU and to a lesser extent NATO and
the US were found to be statistically significant and had a stronger
impact. Payam Akhavan reached more positive conclusions. He
analysed the ICTY through an examination of political reactions to
major court decisions and in particular, the indictments of key
Serbian politicians.51 He found that the Serbian public were largely
“indifferent” to the indictments and that the ICTY was successful in
moderating politics and marginalizing ultra-nationalist leaders.52
Finally, in a series of studies based on multiple research methods
including surveys, interviews, case studies, oral histories, archival
Stover and Weinstein.
Ibid., 11.
49 James Meernik, “Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal
Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia,” Journal of Peace Research 42.3 (2005): 271–289.
50 Ibid., 283.
51 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities,” American Journal of International Law 95.7 (2001): 7-31.
52 Ibid., 13-14.
47
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materials and ethnography over a ten year period (1998-2008), Lara
Nettlefield found that the ICTY had a positive effect on
democratisation in Bosnia and played a particularly positive role in
the creation of new post-war political identities based on the rule of
law and in mobilising civil society groups that lobby for justice and
accountability.53
The bibliographic search threw up a number of survey-based
transitional justice studies.54 The surveys attempt to measure public
attitudes, perceptions and experiences at specific times, and in
specific places, where transitional justice policy—and particularly
trials—are being proposed or have already been implemented. Where
the sample size is sufficiently large, the surveys can also provide
comparative information on various constituencies, including, for
example different ethnic groups within a broader population. With
varying degrees of success the surveys have attempted to define local
interpretations of “justice,” preferences for transitional justice
mechanisms, and how those mechanisms should be administered, e.g.
locally, nationally or internationally.
Weinstein et al. offer a general overview of population based
surveys they have conducted in the Balkans, Iraq, Uganda, and
Rwanda.55 They found that in all countries, people’s ethnic identity
strongly influenced their attitude towards trial processes.56 In Bosnia
Herzegovina, for example, attitudes towards the ICTY were viewed
through a nationalist lens. Serbs and Croats felt negative about
judicial proceedings because they believed that their group was being
singled out for prosecution, whilst Bosniaks expressed more positive
feelings.57 Local politics also played a key role in shaping responses:
Lara Nettelfield, Courting democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s
impact in a postwar state (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15.
54 For a full list of these surveys and a summary of their key findings, see
Macdonald, 91-96.
55 Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Kaba Kinkodi, and Harvey Weinstein, “Stay the
Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities Take Priority?” in Localizing Transitional Justice:
Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence, eds. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and
Pierre Hazan, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 27-49.
56 Ibid., 46.
57 Ibid.; see also Stover and Weinstein.
53
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the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) victory in Rwanda, the US
invasion of Iraq and the relationship between President Museveni’s
government in Uganda and the International Criminal Court all
influenced attitudes towards the form transitional justice should take.
In Rwanda, Uganda, Iraq, Central African Republic (CAR),
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Cambodia, the surveys
reported a profound lack of awareness of and confidence in formal
legal structures and this shapes people’s attitudes towards these
processes.
Large scale surveys enable us to “recognize the heterogeneity of
survivors” by examining responses across large geographical areas.58
By investigating the significance of ethnicity, exposure to violence,
demographic factors and other crucial differences, patterns begin to
emerge. It is often implied, for example, that the practice of
“forgiving and forgetting” is a cultural given across Africa. The
results of three surveys on northern Uganda published in 2005; 2007
and 2010, however, indicated that something more complex was
happening.59 The use of certain terms in surveys, can, however, be
misleading and may lead to ethnocentric interpretations. For
example, a 2005 survey in northern Uganda found that 76% of
respondents felt that those responsible for abuses should be held
“accountable.”60 To a western audience “accountability” may
connote a formal legal process. The respondents, however, specified

Stover and Weinstein, 38.
Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Marieka Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di
Giovanni, Forgotten Voices: A Population Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice
in Northern Uganda, International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights
Center, University of Berkeley (2005); Phuong Pham, Vinck, Patrick Vinck, Eric
Stover, Amy Moss, and Marieka Wierda, When the War Ends: A population based survey
on attitudes about peace, justice and social reconstruction in Northern Uganda, Human Rights
Center, University of California, Berkeley, Payson Center, and International Center
for Transitional Justice (2007); Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck, Transitioning to
Peace: A population based survey on attitudes about social reconstruction and justice in Northern
Uganda, Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley (2010).
60 Pham, Vinck, Kinkodi and Weinstein, “Stay the Hand of Justice,” 4.
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that perpetrators could be held accountable through a variety of
measures including “reconciliation.”61
Truth Commissions
Truth commission advocates argue that this form of transitional
justice provides a “narrative” truth rather than a “forensic” one and,
as such, it achieves a sense of “historical justice.”62 By conducting
official investigations into past abuses, truth commissions reveal not
just what happened but also how and why. As Priscilla Hayner has
argued, a significant advantage of truth commissions “lies in their
ability to delineate a broad perspective on causes and patterns of
violence.”63 This, proponents suggest, allows them to go much
further in their investigations and conclusions than is generally
possible in any trial of individual perpetrators. Moreover, truth
commissions—with their analytical focus on state and society—are
well placed to recommend institutional and legal reforms that might
prevent future human rights violations.64 It is also argued that truth
commissions can support other transitional justice mechanisms. They
can, for example, provide evidence in support of reparations
policies.65
As TRCs proliferated in the 1990s, a theory of “truth” was
developed which highlighted the importance of closing the gap
between knowledge and acknowledgement of human rights violations
and mass killings.66 This was supported by psychological research,
Pham, Vinck, Wierda, Stover, and di Giovanni, Forgotten Voices, 5.
Tristan Anne Borer, Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post Conflict
Societies (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006); Thoms, Ron and
Paris, 22.
63 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth
Commissions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 16.
64 Ibid., 58; Neil Kritz, “Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights,” Law and
Contemporary Problems 59.4 (1996): 141-44.
65 Kritz, “Coming to Terms, 141-44.
66 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Introduction,” in Transitional justice in the twenty-first century:
Beyond truth versus justice, ed. Naomi Roht-Arriaza (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 3.
61
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especially with torture survivors, which suggested that victims were
helped by telling their story to a sympathetic listener and that the
truth was intrinsically important.67 Proponents suggested that the
cathartic effects experienced by individuals could be transposed onto
society as a whole and that discovery of the truth would help restore
social trust and achieve societal reconciliation.68
The South African TRC has been central in shaping modern
attitudes towards truth commissions. As one practitioner remarked,
after the South African TRC, it seemed as if “the world has become
besotted with truth commissions.”69 There is, however, a growing
literature that challenges normative assumptions about truth
commissions, arguing that these too can be very remote from local
realities.70 From Peru to Cambodia to Sierra Leone, scholars have
highlighted the danger of what one termed the “tyranny of total
recall” in places where, for example, silence has an important social
function.71 Rosalind Shaw, meanwhile, has traced the genealogy of
truth commissions and finds their genesis in a western tradition of
confession that has no immediate resonance in contexts such as
Sierra Leone, where a factually accurate depiction of the past is less
important to reconciliation than the “attainment of a cool heart.”72
On a more practical level, it has been noted that truth commission
recommendations are often ignored, “not because they are
unworkable, but because those commissions are inherently weak
institutions with short life spans.”73

Minow, 69; Roht-Arriaza, 4.
Fletcher and Weinstein, 29.
69 Quoted in Hazan, 33.
70 Hayner, 186.
71 Kimberly Theidon, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3.1
(2009): 295.
72 Rosalind Shaw, “Memory Frictions: Localising the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Sierra Leone,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1:2 (2007):
183-207; Kelsall, 14; Kimberly Theidon, “Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics
of Reconciliation in Postwar Peru,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.3 (2006): 433–457.
73 Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic
Wrongs,” Social and Legal Studies 21.2 (2012): 1-16.
67
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What the evidence tells us
It is now fifteen years since the South African TRC issued the first
five volumes of its final report and an abundance of literature has
been produced in that time. Only a small amount of this is
empirically grounded work that sets out to understand the local
experiences of the TRC. The empirical literature is methodologically
varied, employing representative cross-sectional national surveys;
longitudinal panel studies, analysis of victim’s hearings and
ethnographic research. Much of this literature challenges the
widespread approbation of the South African TRC, chipping away at
its mythical status and trying to understand in more detail how it was
actually perceived and experienced by victims, survivors and the
population at large. The results are mixed but an interesting finding
across studies appears to suggest that victims and survivors placed
emphasis on “truth” over “reconciliation” and when the latter
appeared to be prioritized by the state to the neglect of the former,
confidence in the process waned.
A study by David Backer on the TRC is a rare example of
longitudinal research on a transitional justice process.74 Using panel
surveys with 153 victims of apartheid era violations conducted in
2002-3 and again in 2008, Backer captured the effect of the TRC over
time. He found that approval of the unique conditional amnesty
offered by the TRC was at first ‘surprisingly high” (57.5%) but it “fell
dramatically” by 2008 (20.4%).75 Backer concluded that respondents’
earlier support for amnesty was “a reluctant, contingent concession
that coexisted with a basic interest in seeing at least a degree of
accountability.”76 Using multivariate regression models, Backer
found that decline in support for the TRC was most clearly
associated with an increased feeling that the amnesty was not fair and

David Backer, “Watching a Bargain Unravel? A Panel Study of Victims”
Attitudes about Transitional Justice in Cape Town, South Africa,” International
Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 443–456.
75 Ibid., 443.
76 Ibid., 453.
74
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a general sense that individualized “truth recovery” had been
inadequate.
In a book produced over an eight year period, which brought
together a series of evidence based contributions from acknowledged
experts, editors Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe set out
to respond empirically to the question: did the TRC deliver?77 There
is a recognition that the TRC contributed to South Africa’s transition
but the over-arching argument, drawn from the evidence, is that the
commission veered too far from its most important mandate, which
was to investigate and understand the causes and consequences of
political violence in South Africa. Both Hugo van der Merwe and
Audrey Chapman, in their separate studies of victim hearings and
human rights hearings, found that support for the amnesty was
motivated by a desire to find out more information.78
Another general finding, across studies, was that perceptions
were largely divided along racial lines. In 2001, James Gibson carried
out a representative cross-sectional national survey of 3727
respondents in an attempt to measure the “acceptance” of truth as
promulgated by the TRC; the awareness of the TRC’s activities; and
confidence in the TRC.79 A key, underexplored finding was that, of
the racial groups studied, black South Africans exhibited the highest
degree of “truth acceptance,” but the lowest degree of
“reconciliation.” The lack of correlation between the two highlights
important connections between truth and reconciliation and
challenges normative assumptions that the former will lead to or at
least aid the latter. In the Chapman and van der Merwe collection,
Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa:
Did the TRC deliver? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
78 Audrey Chapman, “The TRC’s Approach to Promoting Reconciliation in the
Human Rights Violations Hearings,” in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the
TRC deliver? eds. Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 45; and Hugo van
der Merwe, “What Survivors Say About Justice: An analysis of victim TRC
hearings,” in Chapman and van der Merwe, in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa:
Did the TRC deliver? eds. Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 23.
79 James Gibson, “Does truth lead to reconciliation? Testing the causal
assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process,” American
Journal of Political Science 48.2 (2004): 501-17.
77
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meanwhile, Gunnar Theissen’s analysis of public opinion polls
conducted by research institutions in South Africa between 19922000 found that from the outset opinions on the TRC were divided
along racial lines, and that these divisions became sharper over time.80
In both South Africa and Peru—albeit in different ways—
scholars have identified large gaps between meta and micro narratives
around truth and reconciliation. Research suggests that due to
various political and practical restraints, truth commissions have been
more effective at developing a “macro truth” of past violations and
crimes, while neglecting the micro experiences of communities and
individuals.81 This chimes with the findings of Richard Wilson who
produced the first major anthropological study of the TRC in 2001.82
A key finding, based on twelve months of ethnographic study over a
four year period (1995-98), both “inside” and “outside” of the TRC
was that the concept of reconciliation was deployed from the top
down, leaving insufficient ‘space” to discuss commonly held feelings
of vengeance and desires for retribution. In Peru, the national-local
gap was evident but in reverse. Kimberly Theidon’s anthropological
research revealed a disconnect in the confrontational discourse of
political elites and the micropolitics of reconciliation practiced by
“intimate enemies” at the local level.83 Around the time of the final
report of the Truth Commission in 2003, the political leadership were
distancing themselves from the very notion of reconciliation while
the Shining Path still existed, whereas Theidon’s own respondents in
the affected Ayacucho region of the country were developing
“conciliatory practices” that were “very successful” in terms of
Gunnar Theissen, “Object of Trust and Hatred: Public Attitudes Towards the
TRC,” in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC deliver? eds. Audrey
Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 236.
81 Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball, “Levels of Truth: Macro Truth and the TRC,”
in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC deliver? eds. Audrey Chapman
and Hugo van der Merwe, 143.
82 Richard Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimising the
Post-Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
83 Kimberly Theidon, “Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in
Post-War Peru,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.3 (2006): 433-457.
80
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reincorporating arrepentidos and in “breaking the cycle of revenge” in
these areas.84
As was the case with the trial literature, single case studies
comprise the bulk of the relevant literature on truth commissions. In
Sierra Leone, Rosalind Shaw questioned whether a truth commission
was culturally appropriate in a society marked by cultural practices of
forgetting and moving on.85 In her “multi-sited” ethnography, she
found that the imperatives of “truth telling,” institutionalized through
the TRC were often external to Sierra Leonean communities and
influenced more by global developments in transitional justice than
by the locally-rooted practices of the participants themselves. Whilst
those who engaged with the TRC did manage to transform “truthtelling” into new techniques of forgetting and remembering, even the
best “creative efforts” could not transform the TRC into a
mechanism that would respond to local needs.86
In another study of local understandings, interpretations and
evaluations of the TRC in Sierra Leone, Gearoid Millar found that
the primary characteristic influencing perceptions proved to be
educational status.87 His research was based on ten months of
participant observation and sixty-two semi-structured interviews with
the residents of Makeni in northern Sierra Leone. Millar found that
non-elites held “overwhelmingly negative” attitudes towards the TRC
and that this was largely due to a “disconnect between what the TRC
did and what local people expected of it.”88 Millar argued that “a
norm in Makeni is that words such as help, support, remember and
appreciate all mean to provide resources or money.”89 By using such
terms in its ‘sensitisation” campaign, the TRC was inadvertently
misrepresenting its role and function. Interestingly, the study found
Ibid., 451, 454.
Shaw.
86 Shaw, 207.
87 Gearoid Millar, “Assessing Local Experiences of Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone:
Getting to “Why” through a Qualitative Case Study Analysis,” International Journal of
Transitional Justice 4 (2010): 477-496.
88 Ibid., 498, 492.
89 Ibid., 492.
84
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that the TRC had a much more “positive effect” amongst the local
educated elite, who comprised an “interconnected group of
professionals, NGO workers and self-professed “civil society”
leaders”—all of whom had been “incorporated into the post-war
NGO establishment.”90 This study suggests that the differentiated
impact of the TRC in Sierra Leone was partly attributable to
educational status, the resulting level of exposure to dominant global
norms and degree to which one can benefit directly from these.
Amnesties
Amnesties are central to debates about transitional justice and their
function is highly contingent on circumstances. Christine Bell
describes how, in Central and South America, where impunity was
understood as a root cause of recurring conflict, accountability
measures were regarded as essential to a healthy transition. In
contrast, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, broad amnesties were included
in peace deals in recognition that conflicts were caused largely by
structural conditions including state failure and the privatisation of
power by warlords.91
There is a lively and inconclusive debate amongst
international lawyers about whether amnesties are permissible under
international law at all.92 As early as 2000, the UN opposed the
amnesty provision of the Lomé Peace Accord for Sierra Leone. The
Rome Statute of the ICC also enables a “claw-back” on amnesty
where beneficiaries have taken up arms again.93 International human
rights organisations have argued that amnesties, and particularly
blanket amnesties, are pernicious: they entrench and encourage

Ibid., 493.
Bell, 13-14. The Lomé Peace Accord was signed in Sierra Leone on July 7, 1999
and it called for a TRC in exchange for a general amnesty, however, the amnesty
was repealed after the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
92 Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the peace
and justice divide (London: Hart Publishing, 2008); and Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils:
Amnesty and the Search for Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
93 Ibid., 14.
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impunity and will lead to a recurrence of human rights violations. 94
The evidence suggests, however, that amnesties are still very much a
part of the “legal landscape.” Louise Mallinder’s impressive Amnesty
Law Database demonstrates that despite the so-called “justice
cascade,”95 over 420 amnesty processes have been introduced during
the 1945-2007 period, with many of them occurring since the
establishment of ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, over 66 amnesties were
introduced between January 2001 and December 2005.96
What the evidence tells us
One of the striking findings across the evidence-based literature was
the extent to which experiences of amnesties were contingent on
other processes. In both South Africa (as has been noted above) and
Uganda, for example, perceptions towards amnesties appeared to
alter in the presence (hypothetical or otherwise) of other transitional
justice processes, including reparations and criminal prosecutions for
high-level perpetrators. James Gibson’s survey of South African
public’s attitude towards amnesty investigated local perception and
impact.97 The research was based on a nationally representative
survey of 3727 South Africans conducted in 2000/2001. It was
designed as a social science “experiment” in which the respondent
was asked whether amnesty was “fair” for four different categories of
For recent examples, see Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Repeal Amnesty
Law,” March 2010; available from
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/10/afghanistan-repeal-amnesty-law; see also
Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: No Amnesty for Human Rights Abusers,”
August 2013; available from http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/04/thailand-noamnesty-rights-abusers.
95 The “justice cascade” was a term coined to describe the proliferation of
transnational litigation, institutional change and region-wide policy reform from the
mid-1980s onwards, in response to the so-called dirty wars in Central and Latin
America in the 1970s and 1980s. See Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice
Cascade: The evolution and impact of foreign human rights trials in Latin
America,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2.1 (2001): 1-33.
96 Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions.
97James Gibson, “Truth, justice, and reconciliation: Judging the fairness of amnesty
in South Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 46.3 (2002): 540–556.
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people—people who fought against apartheid; the victims; their
family and “ordinary people like you”—in four hypothetical
scenarios. The scenarios were designed to represent principles of
procedural, retributive, restorative and distributive justice. In both the
survey and the interview the respondents overwhelmingly found the
amnesty to be “unfair,” not only to the victims and their families but
also to “ordinary citizens.”98 Perceptions of the “fairness” of
amnesty changed by nearly 40 percentage points when other forms of
justice were present. Monetary compensation for the victims and
their families had the strongest influence on perceptions of fairness
in granting amnesties, however, other types of justice—particularly
procedural (which is defined as the opportunity for victims to discuss
their injuries publicly) and restorative (apologies)—were also
influential.99 This study appears to challenge some of the existing
assumptions regarding truth telling and non-prosecution. It also
appears to show that ‘strict economic instrumentalism is not the only
motivating factor in judging amnesty” and people are also concerned
about receiving symbolic and “non-material” justice.100
In Uganda, the Refugee Law Project at Makerere University
(RLP) conducted a survey of local perceptions of the Ugandan
Amnesty Act, which came into force in 2000.101 The study examined
the effectiveness of amnesty in achieving long-term reconciliation.
Conducted in 2005, the survey questioned 409 people who had
experienced the northern Ugandan conflict first hand. Additional
interviews were carried out in other areas where the Amnesty Act was
applied as well as the capital. The study found that the Amnesty Act
was widely perceived as a “vital tool for conflict resolution” and longterm reconciliation.102 However, public opinion also demanded
greater opportunities for truth telling to accompany the amnesty. The
government’s inconsistent position towards the Amnesty Act and
Ibid., 545.
Ibid., 550.
100 Ibid., 554.
101 Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, “Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s
Amnesty Act 2000,” Working Paper 15, Refugee Law Project (2005).
102 Ibid., 1.
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subsequent pursuit of criminal prosecution for high-ranking rebel
leaders were cited as factors that hindered the Amnesty Act from
performing its reconciliatory function.
Reparations
Post-conflict reparations can be both material and/or non-material
and they may take an individual or collective character. They can
entail full restitution, compensation, formal apologies, rehabilitation
and guarantees of non-repetition.103 The status of reparations in the
transitional justice “toolbox” was boosted by the creation of the
Victim’s Trust Fund as part of the ICC.104 In theory, request for
reparation can be directed at any level of society: the state, local
government, private actors, individual perpetrators of mass atrocity
or the international community. Reparations programmes, do,
however, have a very poor implementation record. Of the eighty-four
transitions that took place between 1970 and 2004, reparations were
only implemented in fourteen cases.105
Louise Arbour, the former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and
ICTR, argues that unless transitional justice provides redress for
social and economic grievances, it will lack impact and will fail to
“attack the sources of legitimate grievances that, if unaddressed, are
likely to fuel the next conflagration.”106 Whilst she is not alone in
holding this belief, such suppositions remain speculative. On the one
hand, it has been argued that post-conflict reparations can influence
reconciliation and social reconstruction at the community level.107
This is clearly evidenced by the current trend in research and practice
to develop conceptual links between transitional justice and
Pablo De Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006); Roy Brooks, ed., When Sorry Isn’t Enough (New York: New York
University Paperback, 1999).
104 Linda Keller, ‘seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims”
Reparations,” Thomas Jefferson Law Review 29.2 (2007): 189.
105 Olsen, Paine and Reiter, 53; Waldorf.
106 Waldorf, 172.
107 Quirine Eijkman, “Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional Justice and
Post-Conflict Reparations,” Global Jurist 10.3 (2010): 8.
103
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development, and to supplement the focus on legal-institutional
reforms with socio-economic interventions.108 On the other hand, it
has been suggested that reparations programmes can create serious
tensions between those groups and individuals deemed deserving of
compensation and those who are not.109
In an accurate summation of attitudinal survey findings, Lars
Waldorf tells us that “reparations are the most victim-centred
transitional justice mechanism.”110 It is abundantly clear from the
evidence that in almost every survey the search identified, affected
populations prioritize reparations and compensation over other
processes including, for example, trials. This may be because both
monetary and non-monetary reparations are central to the kinds of
customary justice processes that exist outside of formal state law in
many contexts. It may also be indicative of a very pragmatic sense
that criminal justice for “extraordinary” crimes such as genocide will
not ameliorate the everyday structural injustices that blight people’s
lives and require some form of socio-economic redress.111
What the evidence tells us
So, we know that reparations are a popular intervention in theory and
we also know that they are rarely implemented. Beyond that, we
know very little about what works, what does not work and what the
unintended consequences of reparations and compensation for mass
crimes might be. A common conclusion in evidence-based studies of
reparations is the need for a better examination of the practical
design, implementation and impact of reparation programmes.112 In
Peru, South Africa and Chile, the evidence suggests that reparations
Waldorf; Pablo De Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds., “Transitional Justice and
Development: Making Connections,” Advancing Justice Series, International Center
for Transitional Justice (2009).
109 Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar, eds. Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
110 Waldorf, 177.
111 Ibid.
112 Lisa Laplante and Kimberly Theidon, “Truth with Consequences: Justice and
Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru,” Human Rights Quarterly 29.1 (2007):
230.
108
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programmes were divisive. Anna Crawford Pinnerup has completed
the most in-depth analysis of the impact of the South African TRC’s
policy for Urgent Interim Reparations (UIR), launched in 1998.113 She
undertook 30 qualitative, semi-structured interviews, roughly half
with recipients of the UIR and the other half with community leaders
involved with the process. Victims reported that many of those who
did not receive UIR, became “jealous or mad”, and sometimes
“threatened violence.” The majority of those who did receive UIR
reported increases in family and community conflicts linked to their
acquisitions. Similar findings were reached in a study in Chile. A
research team that studied the impact of reparation measures on the
families of Mapuche victims observed that, in very poor
communities, economic reparations disrupted family relations and
negatively affected family and community networks. Those that were
interviewed felt that non-monetary forms of compensation that had a
stronger link to cultural conceptions of reparation would have been
more appropriate.114 In Bosnia, on the other hand, policies of house
restitution and compensation for property loss appear to have had
some success, partly because they were attuned to local needs but
also because they had basis in domestic law and enjoyed international
support.115 Despite an awareness that reparations and compensation
are a high priority for victims, we remain unclear about whether
transitional justice mechanisms are well served to carry out these
interventions, or whether such a task is better suited to longer term
development and peace-building programmes, and where, if at all, the
programmatic links might exist between the two.116
Anna Crawford-Pinnerup, “An Assessment of the Impact of Urgent Interim
Reparations,” in From Rhetoric to Responsibility: Making reparations to the survivors of past
political violence in South Africa, eds. Brandon Hamber and Tlhoki Mofokeng
(Braamfontein: Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2000).
114 Elizabeth Lira, “The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile,”
in The Handbook of Reparations, ed., Pablo De Greiff, 55.
115 Eijkman, 94.
116 “Donor Strategies for Transitional Justice: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,”
Report of a Workshop held on 15-16 October 2007 in London, convened by UK
Department for International Development and the International Center for
Transitional Justice.
113

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2015

31

Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4

103 What does the evidence tell us about local experiences of transitional justice?

“Traditional” justice
The most well-known example of this form of transitional justice is
the use of gacaca courts in Rwanda to deal with the backlog of cases
resulting from the 1994 genocide. There has also been a welldocumented debate about the codification of rituals in northern
Uganda to deal with the violence perpetrated by the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) during a twenty-year long civil war, which
began in 1986.117 What actually counts as “traditional” justice,
however, remains rather vague. Other adjectives such as customary,
informal, community based, grass-roots, indigenous and local are all
sometimes used interchangeably.118 Many activists and some scholars
believe that traditional justice is not just an alternative or possible
supplement to more formal transitional justice processes. Rather,
they take the view that a fully integrated approach is to transitional
justice is best, one in which conventional legal processes are not
privileged. The view is premised on the belief that neither formal
trials nor truth commissions are sufficiently attentive to social
integration and reconstruction.119 It is also suggested that justice built
on established customs of reconciliation and compensation is more
appropriate and practical in close-knit community settings, where
people remain dependent on continuous social and economic
relationships with their neighbours.120
Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (London: Zed Books, 2006); Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the
Politics of ICC Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs 21.2 (2011): 179–198.
118 Tim Allen and Anna Macdonald, “Post Conflict Traditional Justice: A Critical
Overview,” Working Paper no. 3, Justice and Security Research Programme (February,
2013).
119 Joe Alie, “Reconciliation and traditional justice: tradition-based practices of the
Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent
Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter
(Stockholm: IDEA, 2008); and James Latigo, “Northern Uganda: tradition-based
practices in the Acholi region,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent
Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter
(Stockholm: IDEA, 2008).
120 Joanna Stevens, “Access to Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of
Traditional and Informal Justice Systems,” Prison Reform International (2001).
117
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The “local” has become positively signified in much of the
transitional justice literature. It has been argued that a romantic
enthusiasm for using traditional justice practices in post-conflict
settings has created a knowledge gap that has “produced decision
making based on weak data, ex-ante evaluation and speculation.”121
Critics have warned against the “facile” embrace of community-based
processes and have highlighted the unintended consequences of
reifying and providing external support for local rituals.122 It has also
been pointed out that traditional processes can be patriarchal,
discriminatory towards women and young people, and readily
captured and manipulated by the state in order to advance its
interests.123 International human rights organisations and legal
scholars have also raised issues of capacity, questioning whether
community-based systems are capable of dealing with atrocities
committed on a vast scale in places like Sierra Leone or northern
Uganda.
What the evidence tells us
While customary laws and “homegrown” responses to mass violence
have been selectively deployed to complement more formal
transitional justice processes, for example in Sierra Leone and TimorLeste, they have also been developed as standalone transitional justice
mechanisms. It is said that post-genocide Rwanda “responded to
mass violence with mass justice,, creating 11,000 community courts
based on gacaca, a modernized form of a traditional dispute resolution
practice.124 There is a fierce debate around the functioning, role and
effects of the gacaca courts in Rwanda, and scholars who have
Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, “Introduction,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation
after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter
(Stockholm: IDEA, 2008).
122 Theidon, “Justice in Transition,” 296; Allen, Trial Justice, 98; Branch, “Uganda’s
Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention.”
123 Huyse and Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict; Allen,
Trial Justice; Lars Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice
as Transitional Justice,” Temple Law Review 79.1 (2006): 1–88.
124 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,” 3.
121
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undertaken extensive fieldwork in the country draw different
conclusions about community-based justice in this context.
Broadly speaking both Bert Ingelaere and Lars Waldorf argue
that the modern gacaca courts are controlled by the Rwandan
government and have been used by an increasingly oppressive and
authoritarian state to regulate reconciliation and justice processes
across Rwanda. Lars Waldorf’s qualitative study is based on in-depth
fieldwork including interviews with gacaca officials and participants
and observation of gacaca trials from 2002 to 2006.125 Bert Ingelaere’s
ethnographic study is based on twenty months of fieldwork in
Rwandan villages between 2004 and 2009.126 He followed gacaca
proceedings (over 2000 trials) in ten locations in different areas.
Ingelaere’s research team engaged with roughly 1,300 “ordinary”
Rwandan peasants through surveys, focus group discussions,
individual and life story interviews and informal encounters. The
argument follows that the state has interfered in the hearings in order
to collectivize the guilt of all Hutu and, in doing so, has coerced
Rwandans into publicly sharing the details of the genocide, thus
violating a cultural and pragmatic inclination towards silence.127 Thus
legislation and realpolitik has transformed the original gacaca
institution into something qualitatively different: spurious legalistic
procedures, state control and forced participation has meant that the
modern gacaca process bears only partial resemblance to that on
which it was supposedly modelled.
Phil Clark’s research provides a more nuanced picture of the
discrete communities in which gacaca operated including analysis of
local personal and power relations and religious and other cultural
beliefs and practices.128 Clark’s research covered eleven communities
Ibid.
Bert Ingelaere, “Does the truth pass across the fire without burning? Locating
the short circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts,” The Journal of Modern African Studies
47.4 (2009): 507.
127 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,” 7, 78-87; Ingelaere, “Does the truth
pass across the fire without burning,” 521-25.
128 Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, post-genocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: justice
without lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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in five provinces over the full duration of the gacaca courts. His book
draws on 459 interviews with all relevant categories of actors in
gacaca combining “high” and “low” investigations and including
multiple interviews with the same individuals over the seven year
period. Clark also includes analysis from first hand observations of 67
gacaca hearings.129 Clark’s findings suggest that there is a risk in
attempting to draw generalisations about local experience, as “gacaca
in one village can differ enormously from gacaca in another only a
kilometre away” in terms of conduct, vibrancy of debate and ‘societal
impact” of the hearings.130 He argues that while it is important to
recognize the traumatic impact of gacaca for many, the argument
regarding silence risks essentializing Rwandan culture and stands in
contrast to his own experience of wide ranging and animated public
debate at many of the gacaca hearings. Furthermore, in his analysis,
arguments about the government’s role in gacaca tend to neglect the
“importance of individual and communal agency in gacaca and the
vital role of the general population in running and shaping the
institution, often with highly unpredictable results.”131
Luc Huyse and Mark Salter’s edited collection provides a rare
comparative overview of community-based transitional justice
processes in five African countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique,
Uganda and Sierra Leone.132 Whereas most edited collections draw
out general trends in a non-systematic manner, Huyse and Salter
adopt an empirical case study approach. The methodology of each
study is different but all research is carried out against a common
checklist of issues and topics developed by the editors. Huyse and
Salter give what they call a “cautious analysis” of “actual” and
“potential” strengths and weaknesses of traditional justice
practices.133 They highlight the “relative effectiveness” of traditional
mechanisms, arguing that indigenous conflict resolution tools do
Ibid., 8-9.
Phil Clark, “Book Reviews,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.1 (2010):
142.
131 Clark, The Gacaca Courts, 87.
132 Huyse and Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 108.
133 Ibid., 204.
129
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have an added value and positive effect particularly with regard to the
transitional justice goals of healing and social repair.134 One common
concern, however, across cases, was that traditional justice can also
reconstitute pre-conflict structures of exploitation. Huyse and Salter
highlight the persistent ethnic, religious, generational and gender
hierarchies and divisions that complicate and limit the effectiveness
of traditional practice.
It is clear that local rituals and customs are important for
populations caught up in violent conflict and dealing with its
aftermath. However it also appears to be the case that those local
rituals and customs do not form a coherent alternative to formal
national and international processes and that traditional justice
cannot be harnessed to the transitional justice agenda in a
straightforward way.135 A striking finding is the heterogeneity of
attitudes and experiences towards customs and rituals within and
between different groups. This should guard against what Adam
Branch has called the “ethnojustice” agenda, which mistakenly views
traditional systems of justice as “a single, coherent and positive
system… universally, consensually and spontaneously adhered to by
all members of that culture.”136
A new focus in the transitional justice literature on
“everyday” methods of social repair in conflict and post-conflict
communities is perhaps an implicit recognition of the problems
associated with talking about “traditional” justice and an
acknowledgement that the term is usually a misnomer.137 This
represents a departure from a focus on the “traditional” towards a
more bottom up examination of the “mundane” and unspectacular
reparative and restorative activities that people in affected
communities undertake.138 These can include spirit possession and
Ibid., 208.
Allen and Macdonald.
136 Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 163.
137 IJTJ Special Issue 6.3.
138 Pilar Alcala and Erin Baines, “Editorial Note,” International Journal Transitional
Justice, 6:3, (2012): 386.
134
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ritual cleansing; community exhumation; silence, forgetting and
forgiveness. The emphasis in the literature is not on whether these
processes are effective or ineffective but rather that they are often the
only game in town; they are what is actually happening outside of the
narrow reach of international and state-sanctioned transitional justice
processes.
This literature also tells us what happens when formal and
external transitional justice norms and processes interfere with or
engage with local beliefs and practices. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf
and Pierre Hazan’s volume, Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions
and Priorities after Mass Violence, goes further than any other in
providing an analytical framework to understand the “local” in
transitional justice.139 They use a place-based approach to depart from
the “model of collision” between the local and the universal to a
“model of engagement.”140 This underscores the importance of
exploring the complex encounter between international norms,
national agendas and local practices in particular contexts.141 The
collection itself includes qualitative, ethnographic, participatory and
interview-based analysis in nine diverse countries, ranging across
Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East
and South East Asia. It also examines a range of transitional justice
mechanisms, from truth commissions to trials to “customary”
practices.
As well as noting the shifting perspectives of justice over
time, and the potentially important role of silence, which is
sometimes the “only form of security to which people have access,”
the editors identify general trends in local engagement with
transitional justice.142 In particular, risk is inherent in imposing the
“victim” and “perpetrator” dichotomy in intrastate conflicts
originating in part from structural violence. In the case of Uganda,
Sierra Leone and Peru, the authors found that this legalistic division
had adverse effects on truth-telling, peacebuilding and reconciliation
Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan.
Ibid., 5.
141 Ibid., 3.
142 Ibid., 11.
139
140
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efforts.143 This finding ties into other research, which argues that
people often occupy “ambiguous victim-perpetrator statuses” which
include bystanders, collaborators, informants, forced perpetrators,
forced combatants, victims turned perpetrators, perpetrators turned
victims.144 Shaw found that in Sierra Leone, the perpetrator/victim
categories failed to recognize the complexity of the “moral grey
zones” of the civil war; increased ethnic animosities; and neglected
the underlying ‘structural violence,” which caused the war in the first
place.145
Multi-mechanism and “holistic” transitional justice
For both normative and practical reasons, scholars and policymakers
now tend to see the range of potential transitional justice mechanisms
as conceptually complementary. Scholars and others have questioned
the efficacy of narrow prosecutions without any institutional effort to
promote a broader historical understanding of events; the value of
truth commissions to victims without any scope for legal redress; the
risk that reparations might be interpreted as “blood money” without
some corresponding form of accountability; and the appropriateness
of international judicial structures without corresponding national
and local accountability processes.146 There is an appreciation that
the broader aims of transitional justice will only be met by what one
scholar refers to as the “interweaving, sequencing and
accommodating (of) multiple pathways to justice.”147 The desire for a
holistic approach is essentially an aspiration whose applicability and
efficacy has rarely been tested. As so often in discussions of justice,
normative notions of what is inherently believed to be right shape
perceptions, rather than evidence about what has been occurring.
However, it has also been suggested that more pragmatic motivations
may also be in play: a more “holistic” approach encompasses broader
Ibid., 8-9.
Erin Baines, “Complex political perpetrators: reflections on Dominic Ongwen,”
The Journal of Modern African Studies 49 (2009): 164; Theidon, “Editorial Note,” 451.
145 Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 144.
146 Fletcher and Weinstein.
147 Roht-Arriaza, 8.
143
144
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peacebuilding and development objectives, which tend to be better
funded.148
It is striking that despite a general consensus on the need for
a “holistic” approach there are very few studies that interrogate the
interplay and impact of multiple transitional justice mechanisms in
particular contexts. Many studies make reference to corresponding
processes but there have been few attempts to systematically analyse
the micro-level effects of deploying a package of measures
simultaneously. There is also a lack of information about how
transitional justice processes interact with concurrent development
and peacebuilding programmes, for example security sector reform
(SSR) or rule of law (RoL) initiatives. This is despite a call from both
scholars and practitioners for policy areas and programming to
become less hermetic.149 What the current evidence tells us is that the
relationship between different processes can be difficult and that this
can result in competition, tension and mistrust.
What the evidence tells us
In Timor-Leste, Elizabeth Stanley’s interview-based study concluded
that, while the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(CAVR) achieved a high level of participation and made a “vital
contribution to peacemaking” at first, its “good” work was slowly
“downgraded” by the failings of other transitional justice initiatives
and particularly the “inability to challenge Indonesian impunity or
provide redress for serious crimes.”150 The trial process was perceived
as deeply flawed: most of the convicted were low-level combatants
rather than the “big fish” Indonesian officials who orchestrated the
repression; investigative units were poorly resourced; judges
incompetent and proceedings a ‘shambles.”151 Elizabeth Drexler
Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past,” 172.
Ibid.; see also Chandra Sriram, Jemima Garcia-Godos, Johanna Herman, and
Olga Martin-Ortega, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and ExCombatants, (London: Routledge, 2012).
150 Elizabeth Stanley, Torture, Truth and Justice: The Case of Timor Leste (New York:
Taylor & Francis, 2008), 131-2.
151 Ibid., 92.
148
149
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came to similar findings in her anthropological examination of the
“dense interconnections between institutions and representations” of
transitional justice in Timor-Leste.152
Drexler analysed three
transitional justice institutions, the ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta; the
internationalized Special Panels; and the CAVR. She found that both
the tribunal and the Special Panels supported a “civil war” narrative
that focused on threats to Indonesian national integrity and state
sovereignty. As such they became “theatres for military impunity,”
creating feelings of frustration and antipathy amongst Timorese. 153
The CAVR meanwhile, was criticized by individuals who felt under
pressure to accept statements from perpetrators that “were not as
complete or remorseful as they had hoped.”154 Both studies share the
conclusion that the conditions that enabled mass violence to occur in
the first place also structured the transitional justice process, and that
the underlying causes of the violence “remain invisible in official
institutions and representations of historical and legal truth.”155
Nicola Palmer’s work on post-genocide Rwanda examined the
practices of international, national and localized criminal courts and
argued that although compatible in law, in practice “the result has
been a stratified and at times competitive set of criminal courts.”156
Her research draws on in-depth analysis of ICTR judgments as well
as 146 semi-structured interviews with judges, lawyers, witnesses and
suspects from the ICTR; the national Rwandan courts; and the gacaca
community courts. Her interpretative cultural analysis revealed how
the judges and lawyers of each court tended to have “divergent”
interpretations of the role and objectives of transitional justice in
Rwanda. The ICTR was concerned with developing international
Elizabeth Drexler, “Addressing the legacies of mass violence and genocide in
Indonesia and East Timor,” in Genocide: truth, memory and representation, eds.
Alexander Laban Hinton and Kevin Lewis O’Neill (Durham: Duke University
Press: 2009), 219-247.
153 Ibid., 225, 228.
154 Ibid., 229.
155 Ibid., 203.
156 Nicola Palmer, “Transfer or Transformation? A Review of the Rule 11 bis
Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” The African Journal of
International and Comparative Law 20.1 (2012): 3.
152
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criminal case law and the national courts were more focused on
domestic legal reform, meanwhile while gacaca personnel saw the role
of local courts as providing a historical or “truth” account of the
genocide. This important and unique research examining the
interplay of different transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda via
interviews with those directly involved in the process highlights the
challenges of effective cooperation and complementarity where a
“package” of transitional justice processes is deployed.
General Findings and Conclusions
Local perceptions and experiences of transitional justice processes are
complex and do not conform with widely held normative assertions
about what transitional justice “ought” to accomplish. A review of
evidence-based literature exposes normative and theoretical claims
about the benefits and disadvantages of transitional justice as
simplistic, inaccurate and sometimes misleading.157 The evidence
base is made up primarily of qualitative interview based and
ethnographic work, a lot of which is high quality; and public attitude
surveys, some of which employ sophisticated quantitative techniques.
Despite this, there have been insufficient attempts to combine
diverse methodological and epistemological approaches to the study
of transitional justice. Individual pieces of research can be very high
in quality but the overall picture is less satisfying. Once the evidence
is reviewed, we are left with a patchwork, fragmented understanding
of how transitional justice is understood and experienced in local
spaces. Perhaps this is to be expected, given the highly context
specific nature of both the atrocities committed and the way in which
transitional justice interventions may be experienced in any given
locale. Despite this, the final section will draw together some general
findings from the evidence review, many of which were touched
upon above but will be elaborated on more below.
See Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 3-26; Hugo van der Merwe, “Delivering Justice
During Transition: Research Challenges,” in Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter,
and Audrey Chapman, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical
Research (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 115-143, 129.
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Translating concepts

The ethnographic evidence tells us that the concept of justice is very
difficult to translate. In many fragile and conflict affected places, the
term “transitional justice” has little currency or resonance. In
Acholiland in northern Uganda, for example, an area where
transitional justice debates became particularly tense after the ICC
issued its first ever arrest warrants for five Lord’s Resistance Army
commanders in 2004, there is no word for “justice.”158 Any research
design that enforces concepts, imposes definitions or whitewashes
crucial contextual differences is clearly problematic. It perpetuates a
troubling hierarchical paradigm, which understands the local as the
static receiver of global norms and knowledge. A more accurate and
honest starting point is to understand, through a deep contextual,
cultural and linguistic engagement with ordinary people, local notions
of justice related concepts. This requires creativity and a willingness
to re-examine preconceived ideas. It may require reframing the
questions that researchers have asked in the past: it may, for example,
be easier to get at an understanding of senses of “injustice” than
“justice” or it may be more practical to begin by asking people about
locally recognized concepts around “not being treated the right way”,
“revenge” or the notion of needing to “cool” pain in one’s heart.159
To date, this kind of approach has been lacking in a lot of transitional
justice research. The result is that the dominant transitional justice
narratives articulated by donors, the UN and human rights NGOs
have largely marginalized the voices of ordinary people.

Allen, Trial Justice,16.
See for example Emily Winterbotham. During the pilot phase of JSRP research
in northern Uganda in August/September 2012, the research team had numerous
discussions with local researchers and experts about how to define and
conceptualize “justice.” In general it was found that the concept of “injustice” was
easier to think about.
158
159

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.4

42

Macdonald: From the Ground Up: What does the evidence tell us about local ex

Anna Macdonald 114

Measurement problems

It is true that the “great rush”160 to results-based evaluation of
transitional justice is ill advised but it is also important to
acknowledge that transitional justice does not lend itself easily to
assessment. As Colleen Duggan has described, the current demand
for linear cause-effect linkages is problematic and “attribution
obsession” has led to an unhelpful focus on “impact data often at the
expense of process.”161 Demonstrating that transitional justice
processes have achieved or failed to achieve a range of social goals in
highly complex environments where multiple interventions are ongoing is a daunting research task. Clearly, difficulties related to
understanding impact afflict all policy interventions but transitional
justice does appear to suffer these measurement problems acutely.
Even when the scorned linear “cause-effect” approach is set aside
and replaced by context-sensitive and systems approaches,
understanding and attributing effects and experiences remains very
challenging.
It is important to identify why this may be the case and what
transitional justice policy makers and scholars can do about it. Clearly
the assumed, yet often untested transitional justice “outcomes”
including, for example, “peace” or “accountability” or a ‘sense of
justice” are much more amorphous than certain interventions in say,
education or health policy, where an indictors such as literacy rates or
maternal mortality are more quantifiable. But this is still not getting
to the crux of the matter. There is a fundamental, existential problem
with transitional justice: it does not really know what it is. There are,
as Paige Arthur has argued, “no clear theories of transitional justice
and the term has no fixed meaning.”162 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to delineate what and whom transitional justice is for and
what it is meant to achieve.163

ICHRP, 12.
Duggan, 323.
162 Arthur, 359.
163 For contrasting views on the coherence of transitional justice as a “field” of
study and practice see Bell, above, and Pablo De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional
160
161

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2015

43

Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4

115 What does the evidence tell us about local experiences of transitional justice?

This problem is compounded by the fact that transitional
justice policy lacks a clear “theory of change,” that is, it has no clear
understanding of how change works. Therefore, even if ends are
identified, it is unclear how we get there.164 This contributes to the
“basket approach” that scholars, campaigners and practitioners take
towards transitional justice. The broad parameters of a normative
imperative exist; all that awaits is the substance that will bring it to
life. So, everything and anything can be piled in, from criminal
accountability, to societal healing, to socio-economic redress, to ritual
cleansing. The intentions of proponents are generally good and the
research is sometimes based on evidence but over-burdening
transitional justice without revising it conceptually risks turning this
sub-discipline, field or “non” field into a basket case. There is a big
analytical leap between saying, “this is what transitional justice should
do” and, “this is what transitional justice is capable of doing.”165 In a
recent special edition of the International Journal of Transitional
Justice, for example, the editors discuss the possibilities for “reconceptualising transitional justice to consider the practices and
processes with which people live through violence and seek to make
sense of and resist violence.”166 It is not clear whether the authors
mean that transitional justice should be equated with everyday
practices and processes of social repair, or whether it should simply
take them into account. If the former, a word of caution is necessary.
We lack information about how communities recover after mass
violence, and in particular, we lack information about the
contribution that transitional justice plays in this process.
Transitional justice, although rather fluid and hard to define, is still a
loaded term with specific meanings attached to it. Anachronistically
subsuming all reconstructive practices under the transitional justice
framework may distort their meaning and may misrepresent the
societies in question. This is not to undermine the importance of
Justice,” in Nomos vol. LI Transitional Justice, eds. Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy
and Jon Elster (New York: NYU Press, 2012).
164 van der Merwe, Baxter and Chapman; Duggan.
165 Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past.”
166 Alcala and Baines, 387.
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“everyday” modes of social repair; on the contrary, understanding
these processes is essential – but they do not need the transitional
justice label assigned to them in order to provide validity or
legitimacy. Often, links may exist between these processes and
macro transitional justice narratives; but in other cases, such links will
be harder to substantiate.

Methodological and epistemological divides

A lack of theoretical and conceptual reflection has meant that
transitional justice has become a term of “wholly uncertain
meaning.”167 In a recent article, Timothy Garton Ash raises similar
points about the notion of “multiculturalism.” The questions he asks
could equally be applied to transitional justice: “Does it refer to a
social reality? A set of politics? A normative theory? An ideology?”168
We do not really know and until there is more reflection and dialogue
around these central questions, it will be hard to understand what
policies described as transitional justice are really supposed to
achieve. This pressing task is by no means impossible, but it will
require academics and practitioners to be willing to reconsider the
ground on which their work rests, rather than simply defend their
“turf” and its inclusion within the paradigm.
Without strong conceptual roots and a solid theoretical
grounding within which to situate analysis, and without clarity on
intentions, scholars tend to direct their attention arbitrarily to the
level of social or institutional structure that they are interested in or
that they would like to see transitional justice efforts address. 169
Scholars interested in institutional design and implementation of
truth commissions may orient their focus towards an analysis of the
final report’s reception. Success here is often defined by the extent to
which the commission fulfilled its mandate. Those interested in
Timothy Garton-Ash, “Freedom and Diversity: A Liberal Pentagram for Living
Together,” New York Review of Books (November 2012).
168 Ibid.
169 Geoff Dancy, “Impact Assessment, Not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role
for Positivism in the Study of Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional
Justice 4.3 (2010): 361.
167
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macro-level state analysis concentrate on whether accountability
processes have aided or jeopardized peaceful transitions and
democratic consolidation. Micro-level studies, meanwhile, focus on
sub-state, community and individual perceptions and experiences of
transitional justice.
Leading on from this is a methodological and epistemological
divide in transitional justice research. Macro-level research focusing
on the linkages between TJ and systemic properties such as regime
stability or democratic consolidation tends to be positivist; is much
more likely to employ quantitative techniques; and is also more likely
to contain a comparative element.170 Micro-level research which
examines local engagement and responses to transitional justice tends
to be qualitative; is much more likely to have an interpretative
approach and is therefore rarely comparative in any systematic sense.
Because studies “vary sharply” in both epistemology and
methodology, it is very difficult to “coordinate or talk about
important lessons that have been learned so far.”171
Ethnographic studies provide a strong analytical basis for
understanding the “local” in transitional justice but they are only
illustrative and findings are often at odds or contradictory even for
research that is undertaken in the same locality. There is very little
comparative research interrogating how transitional justice plays out
at the sub-national level, especially across communities and
administrative units, as well as between rural and urban areas. 172
Broadly speaking, ethnographies tend to present a negative picture of
transitional justice processes, perhaps because the analytical emphasis
is on the need to complicate and problematize existing “top-down”
approaches to transitional justice. The focus tends to be on the
cultural and political difficulties in implementing transitional justice
policies and a critique of methodological processes that do not take
sufficient account of local contexts. A general shortcoming in
Thoms, Ron and Paris; van der Merwe, Baxter and Chapman.
Dancy, 366.
172 David Backer, “Cross National Comparative Analysis,” in Assessing the Impact of
Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research, eds. Audrey Chapman, Hugo van
der Merwe and Victoria Baxter (Washington, DC: USIP Press), 23.
170
171
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qualitative, interpretative work is that despite a general call to recast
and remodel transitional justice policy and institutions, none of the
studies employ research techniques that demonstrate conclusively
that transitional justice has a decisively negative impact at the microlevel.173
With ethnographic approaches there is also a risk of settling
for a description of local realities and an abjuration of clumsy
international interventions without an interrogation of problems
associated with everyday practice. The everyday is also a site of
violence, contestation and discrimination.174 There is a danger in the
ethnographic work and particularly in the “everyday” approach to
understanding transitional justice that scholars are making a virtue of
necessity. The literature highlights a need to describe what is actually
happening on the ground. The conclusion commonly drawn is that
policymakers need to engage more seriously with the practical justice
provision that is part of people’s everyday realities in ordinary places.
But beyond that, there is little sense about whether these processes
are locally desirable or whether they are more aptly described as
locally present. There is not much clarity on whether the everyday
practices that are being described are regarded as interim measures
that exist in the absence of a functioning state or as a viable, longterm formula for contextually relevant accountability and
reconciliation.
Meanwhile, large-N data-driven positivist research, claims to tell
us broadly whether accountability mechanisms decrease human rights
abuses, for example, but cannot tell us why, how or when. Those
causal mechanisms and dynamics can only be understood through a
deep contextual engagement with the underlying social, political and
economic dynamics in any given place. Indeed, despite an increase in
large-n, macro-level impact assessments, there has been little effort to
understand whether positive findings in relation to, for example,
democratisation and rule of law actually percolate down to the microShaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 3; Dancy, 371.
Alcala and Baines; Tim Allen and Laura Storm, “Quests for therapy in northern
Uganda: healing at Laropi revisited,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 6:1 (2012): 2246.
173
174
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level. We are unclear about whether effects diverge, converge or bear
little, if any, relationship across levels of society.175 The fact that a
transitional or post-conflict regime has a new human rights
framework tells us very little about whether society as a whole is on a
new trajectory and in particular how communities and individuals
understand and perceive these changes and whether this is reflected
in everyday activity and behaviour. It is perfectly plausible that the
same policy may have positive macro-level effects but negative
micro-level effects; the potential of amnesty legislation to lead to
such an outcome has been widely suggested. This does, however,
provide interesting opportunities for future mixed methods and
mixed epistemological research. For example, if analysis of a dataset
tells us that human rights prosecutions improve human rights
protections, this can and should explored further by in-depth
qualitative work, on the ground, which examines local perceptions
and experiences of these apparent improvements and changes.

Over-reliance on snapshots and surveys

With important exceptions, the evidence-based literature does not
provide a strong sense of the dynamic effects transitional justice
processes over both the short and long term. There is a serious lack
of baseline data which is a problem endemic in most social science
research.176 Perhaps worryingly, public attitude surveys are referred
to frequently in the transitional justice literature as “evidence” of
timeless public perceptions, priorities and as a barometer for the
success of initiatives. Cursory reference to findings in these surveys
often appears as a “nod” to including the “local” in research. These
studies face several limitations, however—not least that they
represent a ‘snap-shot” in time—and should not be viewed as
definitive, enduring assessments of public attitudes towards peace
and justice. Research that captures circumstances, attitudes and
behaviour before a transitional justice process is initiated will allow
for a more accurate assessment of actual impacts on a variety of
175
176
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social environments and sectors as the time goes on. The few
longitudinal studies that do exist provide a valuable insight into how
effects develop over time and—in some cases—how long term
impacts can deviate substantially from short-term outcomes.

Neglected themes

Given the broad consensus that transitional justice should comprise a
“package” of measures and the existence of simultaneous TJ
measures in countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and TimorLeste, it is surprising that there is so little analysis examining the
interplay, role and impact of multiple processes at the national level,
let alone the sub-national level. This is an area in which transitional
justice scholarship is failing to keep up with transitional justice policy
and programming. Recently, systematic quantitative comparisons
have provided a better gauge of the relative impact of different
combinations of measures on systemic macro-level properties.
However, the vast majority of qualitative single and comparative
studies concentrate on a single mode of transitional justice. Whilst
the evidence review prioritizes an understanding of the local it is also
acknowledged that that some of the most interesting questions for
practitioners are about how transitional justice is experienced across
the political and social spectrum in any given context and how these
experiences fit together.
Although the evidence base for assessing the local
experiences of transitional justice policy is generally limited, there is a
particular lack of empirical research on certain themes. There is a
stark lack of research on the experiences of women, children and
minorities in transitional justice programmes. As yet we have a poor
understanding of the differentiated impacts of these processes on
specific groups.177 We do not have a clear understanding of the
relationship between transitional justice policy and the media. We
lack research on the role that the media plays in transitional justice
debates at the local level. There is very little empirical research that
makes the connection between transitional justice and other
177
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peacebuilding interventions at the micro level. Again, this is
surprising given that transitional justice is commonly implemented
alongside other peacebuilding and security measures, including DDR,
SSR and rule of law measures. Studies that do exist suggest that the
relationship between transitional justice and DDR/SSR is a
complicated one and provide a clear agenda for further research.
Linked to the above is a lack of clarity on how transitional justice
policies are experienced by perpetrators and ex-combatants. This,
again, is surprising because conceptually, a central dilemma in
transitional justice is the need to balance consideration for victims
and survivors with the reality that former perpetrators may be a
source of resistance and backlash. 178 Understanding the way in which
the latter experience, engage with and are affected by transitional
justice should be a pressing concern for transitional justice scholars.
Finally, it is important to point out that presently, the transitional
justice knowledge base relies on a biased country sample.179 Scholars
and policymakers risk drawing lessons from a handful of welldocumented examples that are not transferrable across cases. A
corollary is that certain countries where transitional justice processes
have been proposed or implemented are seriously under-researched:
these include Lebanon, Central African Republic, Democratic
Republic of Congo and Chad.
Research into transitional justice has undoubtedly progressed
rapidly in the last three decades, but many questions still remain. To
answer them, we not only need to expand our field of analysis, we
also need to question the assumptions, paradigms, and frameworks
that have brought us this far.
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